

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

SECRET

Classification

VERBATIM TEXT

SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS TOPO 2658 PRIORITY

RPTD INFO: Amembassy BORN 1777
USBER BERLIN 448
Amembassy LONDON 7236
Amembassy MOSCOW 1236

DELIVER BURGESS 8:00 A.M. FEBRUARY 11

PARIS FOR EMBASSY AND USRO

Four Power Working Group agreed text of replies to Soviet Note of January 10, together with explanatory comments and instructions to Three Ambassadors in Moscow. Questions of date, place, participation of Germans, and agenda identical in notes of UK, US and France. Text apart from these questions which differs among Three also agreed. US draft set out below. German text which consistent with notes of Three Powers also agreed. You should submit, after concerting with your UK, French and German colleagues, Re length of ~~xxx~~ time for MAC consideration, you should be guided on timing, US text plus comments and instructions. by TOPO 2573.

FYI French struggled with question German attendance with Germans winning out in text of note, after they agreed to drop following language from ambassadorial instructions: QUOTE If the Ambassadors were asked what procedure we envisaged at a conference they would say it would be open to the

RM/R

Four Powers

Anal-----

Drafted by:

EUR:GER:AGVigderman:all 2/10/59

Rev-----

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Foy D. Kohler

Clearances:

RA - Mr. Fessenden

Cat-----

GER - Mr. Hillenbrand

CFA - Mr. Lampson

S/S CR
6/2 4/5/5

FEB 10 1959 P.M.

SECRET

Classification

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES

752.00/2-1059

SECRET

LMS

Page 13 of telegram to Ambassy PARIS

SECRET
Classification

Four Powers to entrust the German experts with the task of studying and making recommendations on appropriate questions END QUOTE. UK unhappy at leaving Ambassadors uninstructed this point, and Group agreed further efforts to be made to cover point. END FYI

BEGIN TEXT:

SECRET
Classification

BEGIN TEXT:

The Government of the United States refers to the note of the Government of the U.S.S.R. dated January 10, 1959.

The United States Government has repeatedly expressed its conviction that the continued division of Germany constitutes a danger to European security and to world peace. This danger is heightened by the persistent and flagrant denial to the East Germans of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United States Government has sought to deal with this problem as urgently as possible through negotiations among the Four Powers responsible for Germany. In pursuing this objective, it has been willing to negotiate seriously on all aspects of the problem. This attitude long held was most recently put forward by the United States in the exploratory talks held in Moscow early last year and in its notes of September 30, and December 31, 1958.

The Soviet Government has announced its intention unilaterally to abdicate certain of its internationally agreed responsibilities and obligations in regard to Berlin. That would encourage, and could result in, an attempt to assert control over the rights of the Western Powers to be in Berlin and to have unhampered access thereto. The danger to world peace inherent in this Soviet initiative is evident.

The position of the Western Powers in this matter has been made clear in their note of December 31. They have no choice but to declare again that they

reserve

SECRET

Classification

100-10
100-10
100-10

reserve the right to uphold by all appropriate means their communications with their sectors of Berlin.

Apart from the question of Berlin, the Soviet note of January 10 contains a number of statements and proposals with which the United States Government does not agree. The United States Government does not, however, propose to discuss these things in the present communication. This is partly because ^{its} ~~their~~ views on the points at issue have been made plain in the note of December 31, 1958, and on previous occasions; and partly because in ^{its} ~~their~~ view neither polemics nor insistence on the prior acceptance of any limitations on the means of reaching mutually satisfactory solutions can be helpful.

The United States Government is prepared to participate in a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and is ready to consider any suggestions as to a date and place, which would be fixed by mutual agreement. The place and date should be settled by the Soviet Government and the Ambassadors of the three powers in Moscow.

The conference should deal with the problem of Germany in all its aspects and implications as raised in the recent exchange of notes between the Governments of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand and the Government of the USSR on the other hand.

It is suggested that German advisers should attend the conference and should be consulted. END TEXT NOTE.

BEGIN TEXT COMMENTS:

18/1/60
81-60 8 C 17

BEGIN TEXT COMMENTS:

On date and place:

1. The Ambassadors should inform Mr. Gromyko that neither Warsaw nor Prague would be acceptable. We should like Geneva or Vienna.
2. It is conceivable that the Soviet Foreign Minister may propose that the Foreign Ministers of Poland and Czechoslovakia attend the meeting. We would reject this proposal on the following grounds:
 - A) That the four powers have a special responsibility for the German question.
 - B) That, in ~~the~~ ^{its} ~~the~~ note of January 10, the Soviet Government envisaged a QUOTE preliminary exchange of opinions UNQUOTE between the four powers. Admittedly this was in the context of a German peace treaty. The Ambassadors could, however, make it clear that their Governments are prepared to accept the description QUOTE preliminary UNQUOTE always provided that the whole German question is discussed.
3. Following ~~the~~ delivery of ~~the~~ note the three Western Ambassadors would approach Mr. Gromyko and invite his suggestion for a date. If Mr. Gromyko suggested the beginning of May, they would accept it. If he proposed any earlier date, he should be informed that ~~the~~ Western Powers would not be ready for such a conference before late April or early May because of existing engagements, e.g., the NATO and SEATO conferences. In their negotiation with Mr. Gromyko ~~the~~ Ambassadors should be guided by ~~the~~ knowledge that ~~the~~ date which in fact would
suit

suit the three Governments best would be about May 10.

On Agenda: This formulation, by including reference to ~~the~~ note of ~~the~~ Federal Republic of January 5, 1959, suggests that ~~the~~ concomitant problems of European security and disarmament could be included within ~~the~~ discussions envisaged. If asked, we would say that we do in fact propose to discuss ~~the~~ disarmament problem as it related to ~~the~~ arriving at solutions for ~~the~~ German problem.

It should be noted that paragraph 6 of the NATO Declaration on Berlin of December 16, 1958 refers ^{to} European security and disarmament. The paragraph is reproduced below:

QUOTE 6. The Council considers that the Berlin question can only be settled in the framework of an agreement with the USSR on Germany as a whole. It recalls that the Western Powers have repeatedly declared themselves ready to examine this problem, as well as those of European security and disarmament. They are still ready to discuss all these problems. END QUOTE.

On German participation: If asked what was meant by ~~the~~ term QUOTE advisers UNQUOTE we would reply that it would be for ~~the~~ Federal Government and for ~~the~~ QUOTE D.D.R. authorities UNQUOTE to nominate whoever they thought fit. END TEXT COMMENTS.

Dillon
ACTING -
(*FDK*)

SECRET

Classification

1959/10/10
10/10/59